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Decomposing Public Opinion Variation into Ideology,
Idiosyncrasy and Instability *
Benjamin E Lauderdale London School of Economics and Political Science
Chris Hanretty University of East Anglia
Nick Vivyan Durham University
We propose a method for decomposing variation in the issue preferences that US citizens express on
surveys into three sources of variability that correspond to major threads in public opinion research.
We find that, averaging across a set of high profile US political issues, a single ideological dimension
accounts for about 1/7 of opinion variation, individuals’ idiosyncratic preferences account for about
3/7, and response instability for the remaining 3/7. These shares vary substantially across issue
types and the average share attributable to ideology doubles when a second ideological dimension is
permitted. We also find that (unidimensional) ideology accounts for almost twice as much response
variation (and response instability is substantially lower) among respondents with high, rather than
low, political knowledge. Our estimation strategy is based on an ordinal probit model with ran-
dom effects, and is applicable to other data sets that include repeated measurements of ordinal issue
position data.
*Current version: July 20, 2017; Corresponding author: b.e.lauderdale@lse.ac.uk
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Introduction Since Converse (1964) political scientists have debated the extent to which citizens
have organized preferences about political issues, or indeed whether they have such preferences at
all (Achen 1975; Zaller and Feldman 1992; Zaller 1992). In this short paper, we exploit recent sur-
vey data from Broockman (2016) to decompose variation in citizens’ expressed issue preferences into
three sources of variability. First, how much is ideological, by which we mean predictable from a
citizen’s preferences on other issues given the way preferences are typically organized in the popula-
tion? Second, how much is idiosyncratic, by which we mean preferences that are not predictable from
a citizen’s preferences on other issues, but which are nonetheless stable in repeated measurement?
Third, how much is instability, by which we mean preference variation that is not stable in repeated
measurement and which combines measurement error and non-attitudinal response behaviours? Al-
though scholars have at various points argued for the relative importance of each of these sources of
variability in opinion, to our knowledge none have provided a quantitative summary of how much
variation is attributable to each one.
Context There is a long-running debate within political science about the extent to which most
citizens have “reasonably well-formed attitudes on major political issues” (Zaller and Feldman 1992,
579) which exist independently of the survey instruments designed to measure such attitudes. On
one view, survey respondents may be perfectly capable of responding to questions designed to elicit
political preferences, but these responses merely reflect the result of a sample of considerations bear-
ing on the matter, which are context-biased in ways that lead them to give different answers at differ-
ent points in time (Zaller and Feldman 1992, 579). Evidence in favour of this view comes from the low
correlation between many measures of attitudes at different points in time; from open-ended survey
questions eliciting voter considerations; and from the extensive literature on priming. Against this
evidence, it has been argued that low over-time correlation is an indication that survey responses are
subject to large measurement error such that stable underlying attitudes can result in volatile survey
responses (Achen 1975), and that many priming effects are better understood as information effects
(Lenz 2009).
If citizens do not have stable preferences on major political issues at all, then there is no point
arguing about whether those attitudes can be effectively summarized by a position in some latent
ideological space. However, if political preferences are at least partially stable or real, then they may
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or may not have a low dimensional structure (ideology) that explains much of the variation in pref-
erences across different issues. There is disagreement about whether preferences can be represented
using just one left-right dimension (Jacoby 1995; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009) or whether they
must instead be represented using two dimensions (Duckitt and Sibley 2009; Feldman and Johnston
2014; Evans, Heath, and Lalljee 1996). The more that preferences can be represented in terms of a
small number of underlying dimensions, the less role there is for idiosyncratic preferences, under-
stood as ‘non-ideological’ preferences which cannot be predicted on the basis of preferences about
other issues, but which are nonetheless real, stable views about particular issues (Broockman 2016).
This paper argues that we can usefully understand these two debates—about the extent to which
preferences are real and about the extent to which they are ideological—as part of a larger question
about the composition of cross-sectional survey response variation. Our decomposition of prefer-
ences into components corresponding to ideology, idiosyncrasy and instability can be mapped onto
these previous debates. The debate over whether preferences are real is a debate about the relative
contribution of ideology plus idiosyncrasy versus instability. The debate over whether preferences
are ideological is a debate about the relative contribution of ideology versus idiosyncrasy (either with
or without instability).
In our reading, no one has directly assessed the three-way decomposition quantitatively. Con-
verse evaluates both the correlation structure across issues as well as the stability of responses within
issues, but the synthesis of the evidence from those analyses is qualitative (Converse 1964). Subse-
quent studies, including the Broockman studywhose data we re-analyse, have similarly done a series
of analyses and then summarized the results qualitatively. The costs of a purely qualitative synthesis
of the evidence are apparent in the subsequent multi-decade debate spurred by Converse’s study, a
debate that tended to get simplified into binary questions about whether preferences were real or not,
or ideological or not, rather than decompositional questions about howmuch of observed preference
variation is real and how much is ideological (Converse 2000; Feldman 2013).
Data To quantitatively decompose response variation into ideology, idiosyncrasy and instability,
we need data with several features. Repeated measurements on the same respondents must be taken
in order to distinguish stable preferences from response instability. Questions on a range of political
issues must be taken in order to assess whether preferences are ideologically structured or not. An-
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chored response scales are desirable in order to limit measurement error associated with differential
scale use, both across respondents and within respondents across repeated measurements.
Fortunately, data satisfying all of these criteria is provided by Broockman (2016). Broockman
surveyed US citizens in early January and again in late February 2014. He asked eight questions as
part of a political knowledge battery and thirteen ordinal questions on particular policies. The ques-
tions covered both economic issues (health care, taxes, Medicare, unions, education, social security)
and social/cultural issues (gun control, immigration, abortion, the environment, gay rights, affir-
mative action, and contraception). The responses to the ordinal policy questions were constructed
so that the middle option represented the status quo, and the next least extreme response options
captured the median position of the Democratic and Republican parties respectively. Remaining op-
tions represented more extreme positions.1 Giving such specific response options mitigates the risk
that variation in manifest survey responses will result from the way respondents use response scales
rather than from respondents’ varying underlying preferences. An example question is shown in the
Appendix.
Though we focus on the policy questions, we also use Broockman’s latent trait measure of politi-
cal knowledge. Correct or incorrect answers to eight knowledge questions were aggregated allowing
for variation in question difficulty and the ability of each question to discriminate between respon-
dents with otherwise similar levels of knowledge. For simplicity, we categorise respondents as ‘high’
or ‘low’ political knowledge using the median score political knowledge score as the cutoff. 1137
respondents participated in the first wave, of whom 513 also participated in the second wave. Aver-
age levels of political knowledge were were modestly (0.15 SD) higher among wave two respondents
than among respondents who only responded to wave one.
Methods Decomposing variation in ordinal response data requires us to make some scaling and
modelling assumptions. We assume an ordinal probit response model, where respondents have la-
tent continuous responses (Y) which map on to categorical responses (Y) according to cutpoints.
Latent responses are turned into manifest responses according to per-question cutpoints which are
drawn from a uniform prior subject to the ordering constraint. Our model for the latent response
1Response options were ordered from left- to right-wing for some questions, and right- to left-wing for others.
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takes the form:
Yijt = b jqi + nij + eijt
where i indexes respondents, where j indexes questions, where t indexes the survey wave (t = 1, 2)
and where the parameters in the model are drawn qi  N(0, 1), vij  N(0,w2j ), and eijt  N(0, s2j ).
The first term in the model (b jqi) is the ideological component, operationalised as a unidimen-
sional spatial model where b j describes how the respondent’s latent ideal point q predicts her la-
tent response on issue j. The signs of q and b are both arbitrary and unimportant for the variance
decomposition. The second term in the model (vij) is a respondent-by-issue random effect. This
term captures idiosyncratic variation in preferences which is not attributable to ideology, but which is
nonetheless stable across repeat measurements t. The third term in the model (eijt) is an error term
capturing instability, variation in an individuals’ manifest responses across repeated measurements.
We are not interested in the sign or magnitude of these terms for any individual respondent, but
rather in their variance per survey-item across respondents. In the case of the respondent-by-issue
random effect and the error term, we use w2j and s
2
j to refer to these variances. The variance of the
ideological component is b2j , which follows from the identity Var(cx) = c
2Var(x) and the fact that
qi  N(0, 1).
Because these sources of variation are independent by assumption, the total variance per survey-
item can be expressed as Sj = b2j + w
2
j + s
2
j . The share of the total variance attributable to ideol-
ogy can therefore be expressed as b2j/Sj; the share attributable to idiosyncrasy as w
2
j /Sj, and that
attributable to instability s2j /Sj. This three-way decomposition of latent scale variance is similar in
spirit to theMcKelvey and Zavoina (1975) pseudo-R2 statistic for the ordinal probit regression model,
which estimates the R2 that would be recovered via linear regression on the unobserved latent vari-
able.
The priors for b j,wj and sj are standard normal, half-normal, and half-normal, respectively. These
priors are chosen so that the prior over the decomposition (b2j/Sj,w
2
j /Sj, s
2
j /Sj) for each issue j is
a symmetric Dirichlet distribution with parameters equal to 1/2, which is Jeffrey’s non-informative
prior.2 These priors correspond to a weak prior expectation for an equal split of the variance between
2If b j, wj and sj have prior distributions that are standard (half-)normal, their squares are distributed c21, which is
equivalent to G(1/2, 2). The simplex constructed by dividing three G(1/2, 2) random variables by their sum is distributed
D(1/2, 1/2, 1/2).
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ideology, idiosyncrasy and instability, and any deviation from this in our results reflects evidence
from the data. The model was estimated using Stan 2.16.0 (Carpenter et al. 2017).
Results Figure 1 shows the estimated composition of opinion variation for each issue in the data
set that we examine. Averaging across issues, we estimate that the fraction of variation accounted
for by ideology is low (14%, 95% interval: 11-17) when compared to that explained by idiosyncrasy
(42%, 95% interval: 38- 45) or instability (45%, 95% interval: 41- 48). Most of the stable preference
variation across individuals and issues is not organised along a single political dimension.
The four most ideological issues are those related to the size of government: Medicare, Taxes,
Social Security and Health. However, the four issues with the most stable preferences are mostly
different issues: Immigration, Marijuana, Gay Rights and Health. This highlights the distinction be-
tween citizens having stable preferences on issues and having ideological preferences. Respondents
to this study have real and measurable views about marijuana and immigration (relatively low insta-
bility) but those views are almost entirely unpredictable on the basis of a unidimensional summary
of their other positions. Stated preferences regarding unions (and to a lesser extent education and
the environment) are both lacking in ideological structure and highly unstable; these are the issues
on which most respondents seem to lack real preferences.
This framework yields consistent estimates when we drop terms from the model. If we omit
the spatial term and decompose preference variation into only idiosyncrasy and instability, we get
nearly identical estimates for instability (rootmean difference of 0.3% across issues), and the estimates
of idiosyncrasy absorb the variation associated with ideology in the full model. If we analyse only
the first wave of data, we get nearly the same estimate for the share of variation associated with
ideology, but we can no longer distinguish between idiosyncrasy and instability. For comparison
purposes, this one-wave model can also be applied to Broockman’s accompanying survey of state
legislators. Averaging across the policy issues about which both state legislators and citizens were
asked, we estimate that ideology accounts for 55% of the variation among state legislators, versus
15% for citizens. This contrast illustrates that it is possible to estimate high shares of variation for
ideology under this approach, as well as quantifying the well-known, very large difference between
the degree of spatial structure in the positions of elites and citizens (Converse 1964).
Adding a second spatial dimension to the ideological component of the model increases the frac-
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tion of variation explained by ideology from 14% to 24% (95% interval: 21-28) while leaving that
due to instability unchanged (a third dimension increases the ideology share to 29%). The fact that
adding a second dimension nearly doubles the variance explained by ideology reinforces the point
that a modest fraction of the variation in public opinion is captured by a single dimension, despite a
two-party system that one might expect to organize opinion unidimensionally.
Figure 1: Ternary plot showing the composition of the variance for each issue. Medicare is the most
ideological issue, immigration is the most idiosyncratic, Unions is the most unstable.
Previous research has suggested that individuals fall into different groups which exhibit different
levels of opinion stability (Hill 2001; Hill and Kriesi 2001) and opinion structure. Figure 2 shows that,
when we split the sample into low and high knowledge individuals, and allow for different ideo-
logical dimensions in each half of the sample, we find that high knowledge individuals have more
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Figure 2: Difference in the percentage of opinion variation explained by ideology and idiosyncracy
for high-knowledge respondents versus low-knowledge respondents.
ideologically structured preferences on all but two issues and have less response instability on all
issues. Averaging across issues, ideological structure explains 23% of variation among high knowl-
edge respondents versus 12% among low knowledge respondents, with a 95% posterior interval for
the difference running from 6% to 16%. Response instability accounts for 38% of response variation
among high knowledge respondents versus 51% among low knowledge respondents, with a 95%
posterior interval for the difference running from -19% to -8%.
Previous research suggests that individuals fall into different groupswhich exhibit different levels
of opinion stability (Hill 2001; Hill and Kriesi 2001). Figure 2 shows that, when we split the sample
into low and high knowledge individuals, and allow for different ideological dimensions in each
group, we find that high knowledge individuals have have less response instability on all issues and
more ideologically structured preferences on all but two issues.
Averaging across issues, response instability accounts for 38% of response variation among high
knowledge respondents versus 51% among low knowledge respondents, with a 95% posterior in-
terval for the difference running from -19% to -8%. Ideological structure explains 23% of variation
among high knowledge respondents versus 12% among low knowledge respondents, with a 95%
posterior interval for the difference running from 6% to 16%.
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Discussion and Conclusion These estimates will not come as a great shock to public opinion
researchers. As we noted at the outset, the ideas that citizens do not organise their views as strongly
as political parties and elites, and are sometimes unstable in the preferences they express, are hardly
novel. The value of this paper is in providing a quantitative decomposition: how much of the prefer-
ence variation we see is due to each of these factors? On average in a particular survey instrument
querying a particular set of issues at a particular moment in US politics, about 1/7 of cross-sectional
variation reflects a common ideological dimension of variation, 3/7 is real but idiosyncratic variation
in individuals’ views, and 3/7 is response instability.
The substantial variation across political issues in the degree to which citizens have “real pref-
erences” (either ideological or idiosyncratic), plus the further variation in the extent to which those
preferences are ideological rather than idiosyncratic, indicates that our results might change substan-
tially with a different sample of issues. The issues chosen include a variety of types of issues (some
primarily economic, some primarily sociocultural), and all of the issues are sufficiently prominent for
researchers to be able to identify the preferred positions of elite actors (Broockman 2016). If lower pro-
file issues were chosen instead, we would expect the estimated ideological and idiosyncratic shares
of the decomposition to decline and instability to increase.
The variation we observe by political knowledge levels suggests that the results might also vary
in a more representative sample. Those who responded to the second survey wave had somewhat
higher levels of knowledge than those who only responded to the first wave. This suggests that our
findings, if anything, over-estimate the portion of variation accounted for by ideology, and under-
estimate the portion of variation accounted for by instability.
In addition to the ways that our estimates are context dependent because of the structure of the
survey data we work with, they are also model dependent because of the way we structure the
analysis. While the model we specify enables an elegant variance decomposition, it makes certain
functional form assumptions in order to effect that decomposition. While we think these are fairly
innocuous with respect to the general conclusions, the exact estimates would surely change under a
different approach to decomposition. Because the data we work with has only two waves, we also
cannot distinguish instability from real opinion change, which is a fourth potential source of varia-
tion in response, albeit one that is likely to be more important over longer time scales than six weeks.
The framework described above can be easily extended to perform a four-way decomposition given
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additional survey waves. The key to doing so is the logic used by Converse (1964), that if opinion
change is real, opinions in adjacent waves will be more similar than those in non-adjacent waves.
In the context of our model, this would most naturally take the form of a random-walk process that
cumulates variation in each time period, for each respondent, for each item. We have also set aside
possible opinion processes that would fundamentally undermine the logic of this sort of decompo-
sition, such as the possibility that opinion on one issue might predict changes in opinion on other
issues across waves. This is an error correcting or dynamic constraint logic that the model presented
above would attribute to instability, but which might reflect a sort of ideological consolidation over
time.
In sum, our findings put quantitative figures behind the argument made by Broockman (2016)
that real idiosyncratic preference variation is much greater than real ideological preference variation
among the US public. This is important not only for adjudicating between theories of public opin-
ion, but also because of the widespread use of unidimensional models, both formal and informal, to
understand interactions betweens elites and the public. The fact that roughly 3/4 of real public opin-
ion variation does not reflect a unidimensional spatial dimension, and the fact that a second spatial
dimension is nearly as powerful as the first, does not necessarily undermine the use of such models.
There is, by construction, always a single dimension that captures more opinion variation than any
other, and positions on that dimension will therefore always be important to electoral interactions.
However, conclusions drawn from models focusing exclusively on a single dimension may or may
not be robust to the fact that this dimension captures only a small proportion of the real opinion
variation on which basis citizens may make choices and to which elites may have opportunities to
respond.
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